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Steven H. Stodghill **
"The Horror, The Horror"'
I. INTRODUCTION
EW things can be more frightening to a civil defendant than the pros-
pect of a massive punitive damages award. This extra-compensatory
form of damages, originally limited to the rare case involving extreme
or outrageous conduct, has in recent years taken center stage in arguments
about tort reform. Critics of the current system for awarding punitive dam-
ages argue that the availability of such awards has fueled litigation by creat-
ing a windfall for a successful plaintiff. Defenders of the status quo argue
that the prospect of a large punitive award is one of the only weapons avail-
able for society in general, and injured persons in particular, to make reck-
less or malicious defendants pay for their mistakes. 2 Given the perception
that punitive damage awards are not only increasing, but are somehow "out
of control," this type of damage, which merited scant attention in the litera-
ture thirty years ago, has come under increasing scrutiny from courts and
commentators.3
The scrutiny has reached the highest level of our legal system on two sepa-
rate occasions in just a two year period. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip4 and TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,5 the
Supreme Court considered, and ultimately rejected, due process challenges
* B.A., University of Notre Dame 1983; J.D., University of Texas 1986; Partner, Lynn,
Stodghill & Melsheimer, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas; Adjunct Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
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1. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 147 (Signet Classic ed., Doubleday and Co.
1950).
2. David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal
Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of
the Tort Litigation System, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992); Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionaliz-
ing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859 (1991).
4. 499 U.S. 1 (1990).
5. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
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to substantial punitive damages awards. Although it was hoped, first in Has-
lip, and more recently in TXO, that the Court would give direction to the
lower courts for evaluating punitive damages awards, little in the way of
guidance was forthcoming from either case.
This article will first briefly survey the current empirical data on punitive
damages awards. Are punitive damages on the rise, holding steady, or de-
creasing? This is a seemingly important question because much of the impe-
tus behind reform of the punitive damages system is the perceived explosion
in the size and frequency of such awards. For reasons explained below, we
conclude that the empirical debate, though an interesting one, is ultimately
irrelevant to the issue of reforming the punitive damages system.
The article will next review the current constitutional landscape of puni-
tive damages awards. We conclude that the Supreme Court has been right-
fully reluctant to impose explicit substantive limits on punitive damage
awards. In the one area in which the Supreme Court ought to provide sensi-
ble guidance-procedural due process-.it has remained curiously unhelpful.
The political landscape, consisting of a hodge-podge of efforts for modify-
ing the way punitive damages are awarded, will also be reviewed. With the
exception of bifurcation of the issues of liability and punitive damages, these
efforts undermine the strength of the American jury system and do not ad-
dress the core problem of the punitive damages system.
The core problem, as we see it, is the failure of trial courts to guide the
exercise of the jury's discretion in awarding punitive damages. Until the
jury is given sensible, flexible instructions that cabin its discretion within
meaningful parameters, punitive damage awards, of whatever amount, will
continue to come under fire. Our recommendation is a simple one: instruct
the jury in comprehensible and specific terms that will allow each party's
advocate to make reasonable arguments about whether punitive damages
should be awarded and, if so, in what amount.
II. EMPIRICAL DEBATES
In theory, awards of punitive damages are designed to serve purposes
other than compensating a plaintiff for the actual damages he has suffered
because of the actions of a defendant. In this sense, the modern origin of
punitive damages is found in the 18th century English decisions in which
punitive damages awards seem to have been a compensation for mental dis-
tress or other intangible losses. 6 Eventually, retribution and deterrence were
identified as bases for separate awards of damages. Today, in the great ma-
jority of states and the federal courts, punitive damages are fully approved as
extra-compensatory awards. 7 The windfall to the plaintiff is tolerated as a
means of securing public good through a kind of quasi-criminal punishment
in the civil suit. 8
6. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982).
7. Dobbs, supra note 2, at 457.
8. Id.
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Historically, the jury has possessed nearly unlimited discretion in deter-
mining whether to award punitive damages and the amount of the award.9
Its decision is reviewed by the trial and appellate court under the rubric of
reasonableness. 10
For many years, this system seemed to function free of controversy. Puni-
tive awards were infrequent and often insubstantial." However, in recent
years, both the size and frequency of punitive damages awards have in-
creased. How much of an increase is, as one might expect, the subject of
some controversy. Anecdotal evidence of skyrocketing awards is plentiful;
hard empirical data is not. This article will not attempt to review all the
literature on the extent, if any, of the increase in punitive damages awards.
However, a brief review of the current literature gives some flavor of. the
controversy.
One recent study of the available data concluded that "every empirical
study of [punitive damages] has reached conclusions that, to say the least,
fail to support" the claim that "punitive damages have grown dramatically
in both frequency and size."' 12 This sort of analytical certitude contrasts
sharply with, for example, Justice O'Connor who, dissenting in the Haslip
case, characterized the growth of punitive damages as "staggering" and
"explosive."13
Recently Texaco, Inc. undertook a study of whether punitive damages
have increased in size and frequency in the last twenty-five years. The study,
entitled "Punitive Damages Explosion: Fact or Fiction," reviewed final ap-
pellate decisions affirming punitive damage awards in four states from 1968-
1971 and 1988-1991.' 4 The study only looked at business related cases, de-
fined as cases in which at least one defendant was a business enterprise.
Cases against individuals and government entities were excluded from the
analysis.
The results of the Texaco analysis are notable in several respects. From
1968-1971, the study found 73 business related cases in which punitive dam-
ages were awarded in California, Texas, Illinois, and New York and affirmed
on appeal. The total amount of punitive damages awarded was just under
$800,000. From 1988-1991, in those same four states, the study found 401
cases in which the total punitive damages awarded exceeded $300,000,000.
Even correcting for inflation, the increase in punitive damages awarded is
extremely substantial.
What is remarkable about the Texaco study is that it demonstrates a
marked increase in certain types of punitive damages awards (i.e., business
litigation cases) using a very conservative methodology. For example, the
9. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
10. Id.
11. Ellis, supra note 7, at 2.
12. Saks, supra note 4, at 1254.
13. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
14. A copy of this study, conducted under the supervision of Texaco's general counsel,
Stephen Turner, with the assistance of the Atlanta, Georgia law firm of King & Spalding, is on
file at the offices of the SMU Law Review.
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study excluded from consideration punitive damages cases settled after trial
or after an intermediate appeal. Inclusion of these cases no doubt would
significantly increase the study's conclusions.
However, the Texaco study does not tell the complete punitive damages
story. The Texaco conclusions, which seem conservative and soundly
reached, are not reproduced in the area of personal injury cases. In a recent
study conducted by the Roscoe Pound Foundation, researchers looked at
punitive damages verdicts in products liability cases from 1965 to 1990.
During that time period, the study found that punitive damages were
awarded in only 355 cases. The median punitive award was $625,000.15
This finding is consistent with an analysis by the American Bar Association,
which concluded that although "punitive damages awards have grown in
frequency and size over the past twenty-five years, the bulk of this growth
has been in cases of intentional torts, unfair business practices, and contrac-
tual bad faith. The punitive damages picture in personal injury cases has
changed very little in 25 years."' 16
Part of the problem is, of course, a statistical one burdened by the adage
that one can prove anything with statistics. For example, an analysis of the
mean punitive damages award in a given jurisdiction could lead to a conclu-
sion that the average award is very high when, in fact, the mean is distorted
by one or a few very large awards. A calculation of the median award would
avoid this problem but it fails to capture the upper limits of what juries have
awarded. Finally, most assessments, statistical or anecdotal, often fail to
account for the tendency of punitive damage cases to be substantially re-
duced or overturned on appeal.17 Is a punitive damages award that is sub-
stantially reduced or overturned on appeal, evidence of "skyrocketing"
punitive damages awards or rather evidence that the current system ade-
quately cabins the jury's discretion?
Nonetheless, the picture, broadly painted, is a punitive damage system
that, in the personal injury context, is not out of control, but is functioning
with some stability. In the business litigation context, however, punitive
damages are on the increase. The magnitude of the increase is open to
debate.
15. MICHAEL RUSTAD, DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CASES: A SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDICTS 2"3 (1991).
16. Report of the Special Committee on Punitive Damages. Punitive Damages: A Con-
structive Examination 2-1 (ABA 1986). In the business context, part of the growth identified
by the ABA is in substantive areas of law that barely existed 25 years ago such as contractual
bad faith. The punitive damages system cannot be fairly faulted for an expansion of substan-
tive causes of action.
17. See, e.g., Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding $25 million
punitive award excessive; reduced to $12.5 million), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1941 (1992); Matti-
son v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing $100,000 punitive damage
award); General Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1992) (holding $15 million
punitive award excessive and reducing to $7.5 million); Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology,
6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (reducing $24 million punitive award to $2 million).
Almost every state permits trial court remittitur of excessive punitive damages. See gener-
ally 2 JAMES GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 18.02 (Supp. 1993).
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We conclude that the resolution of this issue is, at best, an interesting side
light in the punitive damages debate. The defects in the current system of
awarding punitive damages exist whether punitive damages are increasing,
decreasing, or staying the same. The defects inhere in the way the current
system awards punitive damages-at the hands of jurors who are told very
little about the important task they are undertaking. Jurors rely on the
courts to provide them with a meaningful, sensible framework for their deci-
sionmaking. In the punitive damages context, they have been treated to lit-
tle in the way of meaning or sense.
III. THE SUPREME COURT STEPS IN, THEN ASIDE
The Supreme Court first took a serious crack at resolving the punitive
damages "problem" in Haslip.I8  Although affirming a state judgment
awarding substantial punitive damages, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a party in a state court pro-
ceeding from a punitive damages award that is "unreasonable."1 9 The Court
gave very little guidance as to how reasonableness is to be measured, though
it noted with approval the Alabama state system, which provided appellate
review of awards based on factors such as the seriousness of the defendant's
conduct, the desirability of deterrence, and the impact of the award on the
parties. 20
On the issue of jury instructions, the Court favorably noted instructions
that told the jury no more than that in calculating an award of punitive
damages, they must "take into consideration the character and the degree of
the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar
wrong."'2' Although the Court went on to speak approvingly of Alabama's
appellate review of punitive awards, it failed to articulate how review of such
broadly exercised discretion can produce intelligent results.22
Although enshrining a substantive due process right to a "reasonable" pu-
nitive damages award, the Haslip court did little to clarify the constitutional
standing of the process by which punitive damages are awarded. Courts
following Haslip have used its rationale both to uphold and to reject the
constitutionality of punitive damages schemes.23 There has certainly been
18. Before Haslip, in Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257
(1989), the Court rejected the notion that the excessive fine provision of the Eighth Amend-
ment applied in the punitive damages context. It declined to review, however, any due process
issues.
19. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20.
20. Id. at 20-21.
21. Id. at 6 n..
22. It should be emphasized that this criticism is not simply a disguised way of implying
that punitive damages awards are too high. The authors represent litigants seeking large puni-
tive awards, and litigants who seek to avoid such damages. There is not, nor can there be, a
normative prescription for a fixed level of punitive damages. Indeed, there is nothing intrinsic
in the broadly worded Alabama-type instruction to suggest that an award under that ap-
proach will necessarily be higher than one in a system that provides more detailed instructions.
The goal advanced by the authors is more intelligent jury decision-making, not "lower" puni-
tive damage awards.
23. See infra note 25.
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little evidence to suggest that Haslip or its progeny had any real impact on
the size or frequency of punitive damage awards.24
In effect, the Haslip Court gave the Alabama punitive damages system a
passing grade without providing the definite standards under which it was
graded. For example, the Alabama system, unlike many states, prohibited
the introduction of evidence before the jury regarding the defendant's net
wealth. 25 Was this an important factor for the majority in Haslip? If so, it is
hard to explain a post-Haslip case like Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co.,26 in which the Eighth Circuit approved an Arkansas jury instruc-
tion that permitted the jury to consider the wealth of the defendant in
calculating punitive damages. In other words, by broadly endorsing the Ala-
bama system without analyzing how each element effects the due process
analysis, the Court invited additional constitutional challenge in the lower
courts.
The most recent pronouncement from the Supreme Court, and likely the
"final" word on punitive damages for the foreseeable future, is TXO Produc-
tion Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.27 Though much anticipated by critics
of the current punitive damages system, the TXO decision effectively closed
the door on substantive due process challenges to punitive damage awards. 28
Moreover, it deliberately avoided addressing the key defect of the current
system-the process by which punitive damages are awarded in the first
instance.
TXO arose from a dispute over rights to explore oil beneath a tract of land
in West Virginia. TXO, a subsidiary of USX Corporation, leased a portion
of the natural gas rights from Alliance in 1985. Subsequently, TXO learned
that another party, a coal company, might have acquired the natural gas
rights to the property via a 1958 deed. Although the coal company claimed
no natural gas rights in the property, TXO persuaded the company to sign a
quitclaim deed, transferring all rights it had to TXO. The quitclaim deed
gave TXO a claim to all the natural gas rights, not just the portion it had
leased from Alliance. The day after TXO obtained the deed it paid Alliance
the previously negotiated purchase price for the gas rights.
With the quitclaim deed in hand, TXO demanded royalty concessions
from Alliance, in effect seeking to renegotiate the lease contract. TXO in-
formed Alliance that if it refused, TXO would file suit to have the court
24. See, e.g., Latham Seed Co. v. Nickerson Am. Plant Breeders, Inc., 978 F.2d 1493 (8th
Cir. 1992) ($10 million punitive damages award upheld), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3037 (1993);
Braswell v. ConAgra, Inc., 936 F.2d 1169 (11th Cir. 1991) ($9.1 million punitive damages
award upheld); Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 810 P.2d 790 (Nev. 1991) ($5 million punitive
damages award upheld); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 839 S.W.2d 866(Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ granted) ($14.3 million punitive damages award upheld);
Smart v. Caterpillar, Inc., 1992 Wisc. App. LEXIS 657 (Wis. Ct. App., Aug. 18, 1992) ($7.5
million punitive damages upheld).
25. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 6.
26. 979 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1992), vacated and rehearing granted en banc, 979 F.2d 1314
(1993).
27. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
28. Perhaps the only remaining issue in the substantive due process context is the consti-
tutionality of a punitive award that confiscates most or all of a defendant's net worth.
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declare TXO the rightful owner of all the gas rights and Alliance would lose
all interest in the property. When Alliance refused to capitulate, TXO filed
a declaratory judgment seeking to have itself declared the true owner of the
gas rights. Alliance counterclaimed for slander of title.
The West Virginia trial court declared TXO's quitclaim deed void. On its
counterclaim, Alliance introduced evidence that TXO's actions with respect
to the quitclaim deed were in bad faith. Under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 404(b), Alliance introduced evidence of TXO's alleged bad faith with
respect to other oil and gas property.
The jury awarded Alliance and the other property owners $19,000 in com-
pensatory damages for their attorneys' fees expended in defending what the
jury found to be a malicious lawsuit. The jury also assessed $10 million in
punitive damages.2
9
In the Supreme Court, TXO complained that it was denied substantive
and procedural due process in several respects. TXO challenged the jury
instructions as inadequate, the failure of the trial court to issue a written
opinion overruling its post-trial motions, and the lack of any real notice of
the possibility of a large punitive award. TXO also contended that the
award was so excessive as to be unconstitutional.
Although the Court produced no majority opinion, it affirmed the puni-
tive damage award. 30 A clear majority rejected TXO's contention that a
punitive damage award 526 times greater than the compensatory award vio-
lated substantive due process under Haslip. However, a variety of views
emerged from the Court's nine members.
Justice Stevens, in the plurality opinion joined by Justice Blackmun and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected a bright-line test based on the ratio of puni-
tive damages to actual damages. Instead, the test is simply one of
"reasonableness."31
The plurality approved of Alliance's theory of "potential harm" as justify-
ing the award as "reasonable. ' ' 32 Alliance argued on appeal that, although
the punitive award was substantially greater than the actual damages, it bore
a reasonable relationship to the potential harm that could have resulted if
TXO's scheme to deprive Alliance of its royalty interests had succeeded.
Alliance had alleged that its potential loss was between five and eight million
dollars had TXO's scheme succeeded.
The plurality specifically rejected TXO's challenge to the admission of
"other bad acts" evidence in the form of other bad faith land dealings TXO
had across the country. The plurality noted that such evidence is "typically
considered in assessing punitive damages."
33
Significantly, the plurality declined to address TXO's procedural due pro-
cess objections to the jury charge on the ground that TXO had not preserved
29. Id. at 2717.
30. Id. at 2724.
31. Id. at 2720.
32. Id. at 2721-22.
33. Id. at 2722 n.28.
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this objection in the trial court. 34 As discussed below, because the lack of
adequate jury guidance is the core problem with the current punitive dam-
ages system in the first instance, the Court's failure even to comment on the
issue will undoubtedly produce additional constitutional challenges and con-
flicting results in the lower courts.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected the plurality's
focus on reasonableness in favor of a test that focuses "not on the amount of
money a jury awards in a particular case, but on its reasons for doing so." 35
Justice Kennedy failed to explain how this test would operate in practice but
it appears to be one geared towards detecting bias, passion, or prejudice in a
jury's award of punitive damages. 36
Justices Scalia and Thomas, though affirming the judgment, distanced
themselves from the plurality's view of reasonableness. Justice Scalia flatly
rejected the notion that the Constitution enshrines a reasonableness test in a
due process analysis of a punitive damages award. A litigant is entitled to a
fair and rational procedure-she is not entitled to a substantively reasonable
amount of damages.37
In a strong dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Souter and
White, characterized the punitive damages award as "monstrous,"3 8 and in-
dicated she would impose a constitutional requirement of "meaningful re-
view."' 39 Although she recognized that no "bright line" test existed, she
described as "quite probative" some of the factors articulated by TXO as
guideposts for review: the relationship between actual damages and punitive
damages, the size of other punitive damage awards in the jurisdiction, the
size of awards in other jurisdictions, and legislatively designated penalties for
similar misconduct. 4°
What the Court, along with many critics of the current system, has simply
ignored is that to the extent there exists a problem of constitutional dimen-
sions in the punitive damages system, it is a problem of procedural due pro-
cess. Punitive damages awards should not be suspect solely because of the
size of the award. Under the right circumstances, punitive damages in the
millions or tens of millions could be appropriate. Consequently, substantive
limits on such awards are not sensible and are reminiscent of the Court's
jurisprudence in the Lochner era.4' Nonetheless, punitive damages remain
suspect in our current system because of the clumsy, half-in-the-dark process
that we foist upon jurors in determining an appropriate award. We tell ju-
rors relatively little about what they should consider in fixing a punitive
award.42 Moreover, what we do tell them is oblique and often misleading.
34. Id. at 2723.
35. Id. at 2725.
36. Id. at 2725-26.
37. Id. at 2726-27.
38. Id. at 2728.
39. Id. at 2742.
40. Id. at 2732.
41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. In some sense, this failure to inform is an unintentional throwback to the early days of
American jurisprudence where juries were not instructed on the law at all but were presumed
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That the numbers they come up with seem intellectually unsatisfying should
surprise no one.
Most jurisdictions have adopted some version of the following as a jury
instruction for punitive damages:
If you find that the acts of defendant were willful, wanton, and mali-
ciously done, then you may add to the actual amount of damages such
amount as you shall agree is proper. The purpose of punitive damages
is not to compensate plaintiff, but rather to punish the defendant, and to
deter the defendant and others from committing such acts in the future.
An act is willfully done if done voluntarily and intentionally and with
the specific intent to commit such an act.
An act is wantonly done if done in careless disregard of, or indiffer-
ence to, the rights of the injured party.
An act is maliciously done if prompted or accompanied by ill-will or
such gross indifference to the rights of others as to amount to a willful
act done intentionally without just cause or excuse.43
Many jurisdictions specifically add an instruction telling the jury that, in
considering the amount of punitive damages, it may consider the net worth
of the defendant.44
These sort of general instructions are little better than advising the jury to
"do the right thing." 45 The jury is given no guidepost with which to mea-
sure whether one million dollars or one hundred is appropriate punishment.
In any other context, the lack of adequate jury guidance would render gen-
eral instructions constitutionally suspect.46 Why such generality is tolerated
in the punitive damages context is simply inexplicable.
In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania4 7 the plaintiff challenged a 100-year-old Penn-
sylvania statute that governed the imposition of costs in misdemeanor cases.
capable of deriving the law from their own experience. See William W. Schwarzer, Communi-
cating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. 731, 732-36 (1981).
43. EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 86.09
(4th ed. 1987).
44. Forty-three states allow the introduction of the defendant's net worth for the jury to
consider in assessing punitive damages. Indeed, some states require the introduction of such
evidence. See, e.g., Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1187 (Fla. 1977) (allowing jury to
consider net worth); Poulsen v. Russell, 300 N.W.2d 289, 295 (Iowa 1981) (allowing jury to
consider net worth); O'Donnell v. K-Mart Corp., 100 A.D.2d 488, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(allowing jury to consider net worth); Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988)
(allowing jury to consider net worth); see also Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178, 1180-81 (Me.
1990) (requiring jury to consider net worth); Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1983)
(requiring jury to consider net worth).
45. Indeed, some significant jurisdictions advise the jury in much briefer terms than the
pattern instruction. In Texas, for example, the jury's task with respect to punitive damages is
explained in one sentence: " 'Exemplary damages' means an amount which you may, in your
discretion, award as an example to others and as a penalty by way of punishment . . .in
addition to any amount which may have been found by you as actual damages." See K-Mart
Corp. v. Pearson, 818 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991, no writ).
46. See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992) (holding that due process requires
clear jury instructions in sentencing phase of criminal case).
47. 382 U.S. 399 (1966). Justice O'Connor cited to Giaccio in her Haslip dissent in sup-
port of her position that the Alabama system violated due process. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 49
(O'Connor, J. dissenting). The majority distinguished Giaccio with nothing more than the ipse
dixit assertion that the case was not "helpful." Id. at 24 n.12.
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The statute provided that, after an acquittal, the jury had to determine
whether the county, the prosecutor, or the defendant should bear the costs of
prosecution. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black observed:
It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due
Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public
uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free
to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and
what is not in each particular case.48
The State argued that, even if the statute was vague as written, instruc-
tions given by the court to the jury 'cured any due process challenge. A
string of state court decisions in Pennsylvania had approved instructions
limiting the imposition of costs to defendants whose conduct, though not
illegal, was "reprehensible," "improper," or otherwise constituted "miscon-
duct of some kind."'49 Justice Black squarely rejected the notion that these
instructions told the jury anything meaningful.
It may possibly be that the trial court's charge comes nearer to giving a
guide to the jury than those that preceded it, but it still falls short of the
kind of legal standard due process requires. At best it only told the jury
that if it found [the defendant] guilty of "some misconduct," less than
that charged against him, it was authorized by law to saddle him with
the state's costs in its unsuccessful prosecution. It would be difficult if
not impossible for a person to prepare a defense against such general
abstract charges as "misconduct," or "reprehensible conduct." If used
in a statute ... such loose and unlimiting terms would certainly cause
the statute to fail to measure up to the requirements of the Due Process
Clause. 5°
Appellate review, no matter how searching, cannot cure the defects of
inadequate trial court guidance for the jury. The problem is standardless
juries, not inadequate appellate review. 5' The Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized the due process problems inherent in appellate review of inadequate
trial procedures.5 2
The principle that a litigant is entitled to a impartial and rational adjudi-
cation in the first instance is the cornerstone of due process. 3  Two exam-
ples of the limits of appellate review as a cure for defects at trial, one a
constitutional issue decided by the Supreme Court and the other a punitive
damages case decided by the Fifth Circuit, demonstrate this point.
48. Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 402-03 (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 404.
50. Id.
51. Appellate intrusion on the prerogative of the jury in assessing an appropriate damage
award is a relatively recent phenomenon. Between 1879 and 1933, the Supreme Court held in
11 separate cases that it lacked the authority to review the size of a jury's verdict. See, e.g.,
Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal, Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481-82 (1933) ("The rule that
this Court will not review the action of a federal trial court in ... denying a motion for a new
trial ...has frequently been applied where the ground of the motion was that the damages
awarded by the jury were excessive or were inadequate. The rule precludes likewise a review
of such action by a Circuit Court of Appeals.").
52. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
53. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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In Ward v. Village of Monroeville54 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a system for the adjudication of traffic offenses before the
village mayor. Ward challenged the system on due process grounds, arguing
that, because the village derived a portion of its revenues from traffic tickets,
the mayor was not a fair and impartial arbiter. The village argued that,
because the mayor's decision was reviewed de novo in the County Court of
Common Pleas, any problem with impartiality could be disregarded. The
Court disagreed and held the village system unconstitutional.
[The procedural safeguard of de novo review] does not guarantee a fair
trial in the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that the incentive
to convict would be diminished by the possibility of reversal on appeal.
Nor, in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed con-
stitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a de-
fendant an impartial adjudication. [Ward] is entitled to a neutral and
detached judge in the first instance.55
Ward has never been cited by the Supreme Court in the punitive damages
debate. Although Ward involved the right to an impartial adjudication, its
principle-not even de novo appellate review can cure deficient trial proce-
dures-resonates strongly in the context of punitive damages where jurors
are given no meaningful guidance in calculating punitive damages. Appel-
late review is no antidote to the illness of vague jury instructions. A defend-
ant is entitled to an intelligent adjudication throughout the judicial process.
The Fifth Circuit echoed a similar theme in the context of a large punitive
damage award in Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream.56 In Auster an oil lessee
sued its lessor and others for violation of its constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The jury awarded the plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory
damages against each defendant and a total of $5,000,000 in punitive
damages.
Although the trial court ordered a substantial remittitur of the punitive
award, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless reversed the entire punitive award and
ordered a new trial on the issue. The Auster court concluded that the size of
the award was not supported by the factual record and was "inherently in-
dicative ... that the jury was motivated by passion and prejudice in their
award of punitive damages." '57
Auster is a perfect example of the limits of appellate review in the punitive
damage context. At some point, appellate review is nothing more than one
group, an appellate panel, substituting its judgment as to what is fair and
appropriate for that of another group, the jury.
Just as there is no basis for deferring to the judgment of a jury motivated
by extreme passion and prejudice, there is no rational justification for a post-
verdict review process that attaches extraordinary deference to punitive
54. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). The authors are indebted to Robert E. Goodfriend, a nationally
recognized appellate specialist practicing in Dallas, for first identifying the application of the
Ward principle in the punitive damages context.
55. Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62.
56. 835 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1988).57. Id. at 603-04.
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
damages verdicts unless they are the product of juries whose discretion is
intelligently cabined. Post-verdict review is not meaningful in this context
because, colloquially put, the cow is already out of the barn.5 8
Telling the jury that the imposition of damages is entirely within their
discretion and that a punitive damages award should take into account the
"nature of the wrong" is without meaning. To the extent it has any meaning
at all, it would seem to present the risk that juries, as Justice O'Connor
pointed out in Haslip, will award damages based on what they "feel" about
the defendants' actions or some other improper basis. 59
Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp.,6° a Fourth Circuit case invalidating on
procedural due process grounds the South Carolina system for awarding pu-
nitive damages, is a good model for analyzing the due process problems in-
herent in most punitive damage systems. Its scholarly reasoning and sound
practical advice go a long way in bringing rationality and order to the puni-
tive damages debate.
Mattison was a diversity action based on South Carolina negligence law.
The trial court gave the jury the following instruction on punitive damages:
"The amount of punitive damages assessed against any defendant may be
such sum as you believe will serve to punish that defendant and deter it and
others from like conduct."'6 1 The Fourth Circuit rightly concluded that
such uncabined discretion violated the basic tenets of procedural due
process.
When a jury is left to its own devices to take property or mete out
punishment to whatever extent it feels is best in the course of the pro-
cess, our sensibilities about that process are offended .... In circum-
stances where conduct is found to be reckless, gross or wanton, a jury
instructed under South Carolina law is permitted to assess any amount
that it feels appropriate to punish or to deter, without any meaningful
standard or limitation....
... When we recognize that under a rule of law, principles of law are
announced in advance so that the law can be known and the people can
conform their conduct accordingly, an award of punitive damages
which is entered without a legal standard is unacceptable, regardless of
the amount. 62
To remedy the due process deficiencies, the Mattison court set out the
factors on which a jury must be instructed in a punitive damages case, fac-
tors derived from Haslip and a South Carolina Supreme Court case involv-
ing appellate review of punitive awards:
58. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982) ("Retrospective case-by-case
analysis cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings is governed by a
constitutionally defective evidentiary standard."); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964)
("[J]udicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law.").
59. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 44-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Browning Ferris, 492
U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring).
60. 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 100.
62. Id. at 105-106; see also ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 183
(Beacon Press ed. 1963) (1921); OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 89 (M.D. Howe ed.
1963).
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(1) Relationship to harm caused: Any penalty imposed should take
into account the reprehensibility of the conduct, the harm caused, the
defendant's awareness of the conduct's wrongfulness, the duration of
the conduct, and any concealment. Thus any penalty imposed should
bear a relationship to the nature and extent of the conduct and harm
caused, including the compensatory damage award made by the jury.
(2) Other penalties for the conduct: Any penalty imposed should take
into account as a mitigating factor any other penalty that may have
been imposed or which may be imposed for the conduct involved, in-
cluding any criminal or civil penalty or any other punitive damages
award arising out of the same conduct.
(3) Improper profits and plaintiff's costs: The amount of any penalty
may focus on depriving the defendant of profits derived from the im-
proper conduct and on awarding the costs to the plaintiff of prosecuting
the claim.
(4) Limitation based on ability to pay: Any penalty must be limited to
punishment and thus may not effect economic bankruptcy. To this end,
the ability of the defendant to pay any punitive award entered should be
considered.63
The Mattison instruction may not be perfect, and it is certainly not the
only language available to guide the jury's exercise of discretion.64 It could
be refined to make the guidance more comprehensible. 65 However, this lan-
guage goes a long way in the right direction. It gives the jury guidance on
63. Mattison, 947 F.2d at 110.
64. In Martin v. Texaco, Inc., 726 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1984), long before Haslip or
TXO, the Fifth Circuit approved the following detailed instructions given in an industrial acci-
dent case by the district judge in the Eastern District of Texas:
If you determine that the plaintiffs are entitled to a verdict and after you have
determined the amount of actual damages, then you shall consider and deter-
mine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded, if any. As I told you
earlier, punitive damages you award for gross negligence must bear a reasonable
relationship to the actual damages suffered by the plaintiffs, no precise ratio
between actual or punitive damages have [sic] been established. Instead, the
requirement has been that the amount awarded as punitive damages not so
greatly exceeds the actual damages as to indicate that the jury has been guided
by passion and prejudice rather than reasoning.
The appropriate ratio will vary from case to case, depending on such factors
as the character of the wrongful conduct, the extent to which the defendant is
involved in the conduct and the extent to which that conduct offends a public
sense of justice and propriety.
Id. at 212-13. The court went on to use examples of punitive damage awards, including spe-
cific ratios of actual damages to punitive damages, that had been upheld and overturned in the
courts. Id. One commentator has noted that, although the instruction in Martin is "far from
perfect [,] ... it provides a good starting place for the formulation of meaningful instructions
on punitive damages, and it provides defendants with some precedent to support requests for
more detailed punitive damage instructions." See Robert E. Goodfriend, Preserving Error in
Punitive Damages Cases, 53 TEX. B.J. 1282, 1290 (1990).
65. Based on our belief that a jury can only make intelligent decisions when its discretion
is properly channeled, we propose by way of example the following instruction to guide the
jury's calculation of punitive damages following a fact-finding of gross negligence. Its general
language could be modified to fit the facts of a particular case.
Because you have found the defendant was grossly negligent, you must now
determine whether to award punitive damages. The law permits, but does not
require you, to award such damages to punish or make an example of the de-
fendant and to deter the defendant and others from similar conduct in the fu-
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several important factors. First, it tells them that any punitive award should
bear a relationship to the harm caused and the nature of the defendant's
conduct. This instruction is critical to focusing the jury on the defendant's
wrongful act and its consequences. It specifically avoids, however, telling
ture. Any amount that you award in punitive damages will be received by the
plaintiff in addition to any compensatory damages you have found.
An award of punitive damages is up to your judgment and common sense.
You may award such damages or you may choose not to. If you decide to award
punitive damages in this case, the following factors should be used by you to
guide your determination of the amount of such damages:
(i) Relation of punitive damages to the defendant's conduct. Any award of
punitive damages should take into account the actual harm caused or harm that
could have been caused by the defendant's conduct. How long did the defend-
ant's conduct last? Was it brief or did it cover a long period of time? How long
was the defendant aware of the wrongfulness of his conduct? If the defendant's
conduct did not cause the risk of great harm, you may decide that the defend-
ant's punishment should be small. However, if the defendant's conduct, though
causing limited harm in this case, created a risk of much greater harm, then you
may decide that a larger punishment is justified.
If the defendant concealed or tried to cover up his actions, you may consider
that in your punitive damages determination. You may also consider whether
the defendant made a good faith attempt to correct the problem or prevent it
from happening in the future. In other words, you should consider all the ac-
tions of the defendant in determining whether he should be punished or made an
example of in this case.
In reaching an appropriate amount of punishment, you may also consider, for
example, the profits gained by the defendant from his conduct, if any, as well as
the costs and time spent by the plaintiff in having to bring this case to court.
These factors, as well as others that your common sense and judgment tell you
are important, can enter into your discussion about the proper amount of puni-
tive damages to award, if any.
The law does not require that there be a fixed ratio between what you have
awarded as actual damages and what you may award as punitive damages. In
other words, the punitive damages can be more than, less than, or equal to the
amount of actual damages. However, as I stated earlier, you should consider
the actual harm that was caused or that could have been caused in evaluating
how much, if any, punitive damages are fair in this case.
(2) Wealth of the defendant. A small penalty may have a great impact on a
poor defendant, but very little impact on a wealthy one. You have been
presented evidence of the defendant's wealth to help you evaluate what would be
a proper penalty for this defendant. In our system of justice, we do not punish
people or businesses simply because of their wealth. That would be unfair.
Thus, you should not decide to award a substantial figure of punitive damages
simply because the defendant has what you view as a substantial amount of
assets. The defendant's wealth has been given to you solely to allow you to
come up with a punitive damage award that makes sense under the facts of this
case. Any other use of this evidence would be improper.
Keep in mind that any punitive award should not financially cripple the de-
fendant or put the defendant out of business-but should, as I stated earlier,
deter the defendant and others in his position from acting wrongfully in future
cases.
(3) Other penalties that have or may be imposed. If, based on the evidence
you have heard, the defendant has received, or is likely to receive, other penal-
ties for the conduct in this case, you may decide that such circumstances should
reduce your calculation of a punitive damage award.
This instruction, though admittedly lengthy, provides the kind of educated guidance that a
jury needs to make a sensible determination of a punitive damages issue. See generally Walter
W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Peisistent Failure to Communi-
cate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 90-91 (1988).
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the jury that a punitive award must have some proportional relationship to
any compensatory award, merely that any compensatory award should be
considered by the jury in assessing a punitive total.
Moreover, the Mattison instruction, consistent with the analysis in TXO,
properly focuses the jury on the profits the defendant received (or, arguably,
could have received) as a basis for calculating punitive damages. This gives
the jury a general benchmark for deliberation.
Finally, the jury is cautioned that their calculation of a punitive award
should take into account a defendant's ability to pay. This allows a consid-
eration of net worth but limits the ability of a single punitive award to bank-
rupt a defendant. 66
IV. THE POST-TXO LANDSCAPE
Mattison was decided after Haslip but before TXO. Unfortunately, the
few reported decisions post-TXO have rejected the Mattison approach to
providing more guidance to the jury in the punitive damages determination.
Though TXO expressly declined to review the West Virginia jury charge for
compliance with due process, the tone of the Court's analysis has created an
atmosphere hostile to any challenge, even a procedural one, to the punitive
damages system. Two recent cases, one state and one federal, are instructive
in this regard.
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Lemon 67 the Houston Court of Ap-
peals became one of the first courts to apply a TXO analysis to its state's
common-law method of awarding punitive damages. In this case, Missouri
Pacific ("MoPac") and its engineer, Raymond Johnson, appealed from a
judgment awarding over $2 million in actual damages and $10 million in
punitives arising out of a railway accident that caused the death of Sharon
Lemon.
In its appeal, MoPac mounted a comprehensive attack on the punitive
damage award, focusing on its alleged excessiveness under both the accepted
standards of Texas appellate review and, more broadly, under the federal
and state constitutions.
In two points of error, MoPac complained that the Texas system for
awarding punitive damages violated the due process clause of the federal
constitution and the "due course of law" provision of the Texas constitution.
Citing to Haslip and TXO, the court rejected these challenges. The court
66. There have been a few states that have legislatively adopted the approach advocated
by the authors regarding more detailed jury instructions. With the exception of Minnesota
and New Jersey, however, the statutes simply provide definitions of terms like malice and
fraud as opposed to providing detailed guidance. But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3)
(West 1992). The Minnesota statute requires instruction that punitive damages "shall be mea-
sured by those factors which justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including the
seriousness of hazard to the public arising from the defendant's misconduct ... the profitabil-
ity of the misconduct to the defendant.., the financial condition of the defendant and the total
effect of other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a result of the miscon-
duct," including other compensatory and punitive awards and criminal penalties.
67. 861 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
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concluded that the Texas system provided adequate procedural safeguards
for an award of punitive damages. 68
The court also rejected MoPac's challenge to the brief jury instruction
approved in Texas for guiding the jury's determination of punitive dam-
ages.69 The court approved this instruction as satisfying due process because
it properly defines the two primary purposes for punitive damages, deter-
rence and punishment, and limited the jury's discretion to these purposes.
Although acknowledging that the instruction was not as detailed as that up-
held in Haslip, the instruction nonetheless "enlightened the jury as to the
punitive damages' nature and purpose, identified the damages as punishment
for civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and explained that their imposi-
tion was not compulsory." '70
The Lemon court's approval of the Texas "instruction" is frustrating. The
court did not even attempt to grapple with the issue of how the unchannel-
led, unfettered discretion provided by the Texas pattern charge intelligently
instructed the jury to do anything. 7' To be sure, the creation of appropri-
ately detailed instructions that both create and cabin discretion is a difficult
task, but mere difficulty is certainly no excuse for failing even to try. The
courts of appeal exist to give trial courts guidance on how to conduct trials
fairly and rationally, and formulation of proper instructions is at the core of
a just trial procedure.
The Lemon approach is a serious blow to judicial attempts to reform the
punitive damages process in Texas and elsewhere. In addition to rejecting
MoPac's challenge to the jury instructions, the court also rejected a number
of other challenges to the fundamental fairness of the Texas system, includ-
ing MoPac's request for a bifurcated trial.7 2
68. Id. at 524. The court cited to TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001-.009
(Vernon Supp. 1993). These sections, which act as part of Texas' tort reform legislation, set
out numerous safeguards in the punitive damage context. They include limiting the amount of
damages recoverable in certain tort actions, specifying the grounds for recovering punitive
damages to three statutorily defined circumstances involving fraud, malice, and gross negli-
gence, and eliminating punitive damages in a case where only nominal damages are awarded.
69. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d at 525.
70. Id.
71. MoPac had proposed the following instruction:
"Exemplary damages" means an amount which you may in you [sic] discretion
award as an example to others and as a penalty or by way of punishment, in
addition to any amount that you may have found as actual damages. In deter-
mining the amount of exemplary damages, you may consider the nature of the
wrong, the character of the conduct involved, the degree of culpability of the
wrongdoer, the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned . .. and
[MoPac]'s net worth. However, the evidence of net worth is not to be used ...
for any purposes of vindictiveness or out of any passion of prejudice against
[MoPac] simply because it is prosperous.
Id. at 526. The Lemon court dismissed MoPac's claim of error based on the trial court's
refusal to submit this instruction on the ground that the Texas pattern instruction satisfied due
process and the failure to submit an alternative instruction was not an abuse of discretion. Id.
72. In rejecting MoPac's request for a bifurcated trial, the court noted, without analysis,
that Texas law does not mandate such a proceeding, and there is nothing in either Haslip or
TXO that mandates bifurcated proceedings. The court additionally noted that, other than
suggesting that a bifurcated trial would minimize the prejudicial impact of net worth evidence,
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The federal courts have shown no more interest than the state courts in
taking steps to guide the jury's discretion following TXO. In Dunn v.
Hovic73 the Third Circuit considered, inter alia, a procedural due process
challenge to jury instructions on punitive damages in an asbestos case. The
jury awarded the plaintiff Dunn $500,000 in compensatory damages and $2
million in punitive damages.74 The defendant challenged the jury instruc-
tions as violative of its right to due process.
The district court instructed the jury that punitive damages are allowed
"for wanton and reckless behavior... [where] defendant's conduct was out-
rageous because done with an evil motive or done with reckless indifference
to the rights of others."' 75 As for the determination of a proper amount of
punitive damages, the court simply told the jury that "it should be an award
which stings [i.e., punishes] the defendant and will act as a deterrent to such
conduct by the defendant in the future and a warning to others."' 76 After
citing to Haslip and TXO, the Third Circuit concluded that "[w]hile we ac-
knowledge that the district court could have given the jury more guidance
on the issue of punitive damages, we cannot conclude that the charge was
constitutionally defective." '77
How the Third Circuit intended to guide future instructions is far from
clear. Is the court's finding that the instructions satisfied minimal due pro-
cess an unreserved imprimatur on such language in future charges? But
what of the court's "acknowledgement" that the instruction could have
given the jury more guidance? In what respect? The court's failure to pro-
vide additional language, even if merely precatory, is an abdication of the
court's responsibility to provide meaningful standards for the exercise of jury
discretion. 78 Litigants on both sides of the docket are entitled to an intelli-
gent trial procedure. The circuit courts should aid, not hinder, this goal.
The failure of the courts in general to recognize the procedural due pro-
cess problems inherent in the vague and generalized instructions jurors are
given on punitive damages is made all the more frustrating by empirical re-
search unequivocally demonstrating that the wording of instructions has a
profound effect on juror comprehension. Professors Steele and Thornburg
conducted empirical research concerning juror comprehension of certain
MoPac demonstrated no actual harm arising out of the trial court's refusal to conduct bifur-
cated proceedings. Id. at 527-28.
73. 1 F.3d 1371 (3rd Cir. 1993) (en banc).
74. If one uses a ratio-bound approach to the punitive damages debate, then this award
seems well within acceptable actual to punitive ratios. Again, however, the amount of punitive
damages is not the issue. Perhaps $2 million dollars is not enough, perhaps it is too much.
The issue is not the amount, but the process by which the amount is reached.
75. Dunn, I F.3d at 1380.
76. Id.
77. Id. (footnote omitted).
78. While the court cites Section 908(2) of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, this ref-
erence is not enough to explain the standards to be used by a jury in arriving at an appropriate
punitive damage award. See id. at 1374. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides in
Section 908(2) that: "punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, be-
cause of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2).
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pattern jury instructions in Dallas County, Texas. Their research revealed
that jurors instructed on such terms as proximate cause and negligence were
able to paraphrase correctly an accurate statement of the law less than 13%
of the time. Instructions rewritten to clarify meaning resulted in over a 90%
increase in comprehension. 79
There is little dispute that juror comprehension of instructions can be out-
come determinative.80 If a jury cannot make sense of the instructions it re-
ceives, it cannot reach a sensible verdict. There can be few areas in the civil
law where juror comprehension is more important than punitive damages.
The jury's role in determining punitive damages transcends the pure fact
finding involved in a determination of liability or compensatory damages. In
assessing punitive damages, the jury is supposedly balancing sophisticated
interests like retribution and deterrence all without the benefit, in most juris-
dictions, of guidance more detailed than simply "do the right thing."' s
V. MISGUIDED LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE JURY
The jury's discretion has been limited in specific ways in many states, gen-
erally under the guise of tort reform. The typical response has been to mod-
ify legislatively the way punitive damages are awarded either by changing
the burden of proof or by limiting the amount of punitive damages that can
by awarded. Neither of these reforms is an appropriate solution to the
problem. 82
Some states, typically by statute, have created a higher burden of proof for
an award of punitive damages. The revised standard is usually one of "clear
and convincing evidence."' 83 One state legislature has passed a statute that
actually imposes the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" upon
a plaintiff seeking to recover punitive damages.8 4 The rationale for these
statutes is often predicated on the notion that, because punitive damages are
quasi-criminal in nature, the burden of proof should be more than a mere
preponderance.
The problem with this sort of solution is that it cuts against the whole
concept of the requirements of proof in a civil trial, a trial between two pri-
vate parties seeking to redress a private wrong. Punitive damages are not
automatically available to every plaintiff. In all jurisdictions that allow such
79. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 66, at 90-91.
80. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 232 (1983) (finding that mock juries
reach improper verdicts when instructions fail to guide deliberations in coherent manner);
Richard D. Katzev & Scott S. Wishart, The Impact of Judicial Commentary Concerning Eye-
witness Identifications on Jury Decision Making, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (1985)
(describing impact on juries of cautionary instructions regarding eyewitness testimony in crim-
inal case).
81. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West 1992).
83. ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1993); IND. CODE § 34-4-34-2 (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c)
(Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 549.20(1) (1986);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (Anderson 1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 41.315 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1983).
84. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127 (1993).
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damages, the plaintiff must show, for example, something more than mere
negligence. She must show gross negligence, reckless conduct, bad faith or
malicious conduct.85 Saddling a plaintiff with an additional burden seems
not simply unfair, but irrational. In a civil lawsuit, every fact at issue is
governed by a single standard-preponderance of the evidence. Singling out
the fact determination that forms the basis for a particular type of damages
makes no sense and has no real parallel anywhere in the law. Moreover,
making punitive damages harder to prove rewards the defendant for gross
misconduct and, from an economic efficiency standpoint, does not provide
the proper disincentive for undesirable behavior.86
Another remedy for the perceived punitive damages problem is statutorily
imposed caps or limits on the total amount the jury may award. Instead of
directly addressing the real problem of unintelligible jury instructions, caps
simply limit damages either by creating an acceptable ratio between punitive
and actual damages or, in some cases, by setting a flat limit.87
Again, this solution seems ill-suited to the problem. What legislatively
imposed ratio or limit can account for the wide variety of conduct that can
lead a jury to impose punitive damages? Moreover, why should a defendant
who has acted recklessly or in bad faith receive what amounts to a free pass
from the legislature for his conduct? This approach seems akin to a parent
who, concerned with his adolescent's disruptive behavior, imposes an early
curfew without ever inquiring as to the motivation for the behavior in the
first place. What is short-sighted parenting in one instance is ill-conceived
lawmaking in another.
Statutory caps or fixed ratios will also be inadequate in a situation where
the defendant's conduct is egregious but the actual harm inflicted is not. In
Hospital Authority of Gwinnett County v. Jones88 the jury awarded $5001 in
compensatory damages and $1.3 million in punitive damages. From the per-
spective of caps or ratios, this appears to be an outrageous verdict. Yet the
facts warranted a large award.89 The defendant hospital transported a burn
victim by helicopter to a distant member of the hospital's chain for treat-
ment even though a comparable burn unit was available in a nearby rival
hospital. The helicopter crashed but caused only minor additional injuries
to the burn victim. Though the actual damages were small, the risk of injury
created by the defendant's conduct justified a large punitive award.
Some commentators have suggested that caps or ratios cut against the
85. ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 1993); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1992); OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.21 (Anderson 1992).
86. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that judg-
ment for total amount of punitive damages may not exceed three times the amount of compen-
satory damages); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (Supp. 1993) (stating that punitive damages
in tort actions shall not exceed $250,000); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007
(Vernon Supp. 1993) (stating that punitive damages, in certain causes of action, may not ex-
ceed four times the amount of actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater).
88. 409 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992).
89. See id. at 503.
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type of claim for which punitive damages are most desirable-small frauds
or acts of bad faith spread out amongst a large number of victims. More-
over, to the extent punitive damages are intended to encourage private re-
dress of public wrongs, caps or ratios make the risk of enforcement less
attractive to potential plaintiffs.
Caps or ratios also fail to capture the full economic benefit that a defend-
ant derives from his wrongful conduct. In a property rights case like TXO,
for example, compensatory damages are inadequate to make the plaintiff
whole because "[tihey do not restore [the plaintiff's] preexisting opportuni-
ties for obtaining exchange value[s] .... The now impossible trade would
have made [the plaintiff] more than whole." 90
Arbitrary limits on punitive damages also fail to account for society's in-
terest in deterring and punishing wrongful conduct. Society punishes a thief,
for example, by doing more than simply making him return the stolen prop-
erty. Society adds an "undefinable kicker" to represent its interest in pro-
tecting the rules of property.9'
Moreover, legislative solutions like enhanced burdens of proof or limits on
punitive damages, to some degree devalue the role of the jury as the pur-
veyor of justice in our society, a role guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment.
That amendment is a considered reflection, made by the founders of our
government, that judges (and to some extent, legislators) could not be relied
upon to reflect the conscience of the community. As Chief Justice Rehn-
quist once observed:
The founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by jury in civil
cases an important bulwark against tyranny . . . a safeguard too pre-
cious to be left to the whim of... the judiciary .... Trial by a jury of
laymen rather than by the sovereign's judges was important to the foun-
ders because juries represent the layman's common sense .... and thus
keep the administration of law in accord with the wishes and feelings of
the community.... Those who favored juries believed that a jury would
reach a result that a judge either could not or would not reach. 92
In spite of the limits of legislative tinkering, there is one reform, adopted
in several states, that is consistent with the authors' thesis that a properly
informed and channelled jury is the key ingredient missing from the punitive
damages system. 9 3 That reform is the bifurcation of the liability and puni-
90. Haddock, supra note 3, at 16.
91. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1126 (1972).
92. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
93. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring that the trial court
"shall, on application of any defendant, preclude the admission of evidence of that defendant's
profits or financial condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff awarding
actual damages and finds that a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression or fraud" and such
evidence "shall be presented to the same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff and found one
or more defendants guilty of malice, oppression or fraud."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(4)
(West Supp. 1993). "In a civil action in which punitive damages are sought, the trier of fact
shall, if requested by any of the parties, first determine whether any compensatory damages are
to be awarded, Evidence of the financial condition of the defendant and other evidence rele-
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tive damages determination at trial. Bifurcation takes nothing away from
the jury, nor does it arbitrarily limit or cap the jury's determination. Rather,
by separating the issue of whether the defendant is liable from whether the
defendant should be punished (which must sensibly include telling the jury
how much the defendant can afford to pay), 94 the risk that the issue of the
defendant's wealth will taint the liability determination is minimized, if not
completely eliminated. 95 Although bifurcation has typically been mandated
by statute, there is nothing to stop a court from imposing this procedure as a
matter of practice.96 Courts that have refused to adopt this indisputably fair
procedure are neglecting their responsibility to bring order and rationality to
the justice system. 97
VI. CONCLUSION
In most jurisdictions, the punitive damages system is in need of reform.
Attempts to constitutionalize substantive limits smack of improper judicial
legislation. Legislative tinkering with the burden of proof or prescribing
fixed caps or ratios seem unnecessarily outcome determinative and tend to
undermine the role of the jury. Sensible reform ought to emphasize the
strength of the American judicial system-the common sense and conviction
of ordinary citizens who serve on juries. No one would ever expect any jury
to sort out an antitrust or securities case or even the simplest of criminal
cases without detailed and intelligent instructions. An assessment of puni-
tive damages should be no exception. A jury whose exercise of discretion is
guided by intelligent instructions that detail the purposes of punitive dam-
ages and provide some conceptual benchmarks by which such damages
should be calculated will produce fair results for both sides of the litigation.
A jury guided by the current, near-meaningless language of most pattern
vant only to punitive damages is not admissible in that proceeding. After a determination has
been made, the trier of fact shall, in a separate proceeding, determine whether and in what
amount punitive damages will be awarded." Id.
Some states have taken the bifurcation concept too far, removing the punitive damage deter-
mination issue from the jury entirely. Thus, the jury's role as conscience of the community is
abrogated. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(C)(2) (Anderson 1993) ("In a tort
action, whether the trier of fact is a jury or the court, if the trier of fact determines that any
defendant is liable for punitive or exemplary damages, the amount of those damages shall be
determined by the court.").
94. "[T]he underlying deterrent rationale of punitive damages seems to demand consider-
ation of a defendant's wealth, since a sum that would deter a poor person may have little or no
impact on a rich person." Jerry J. Phillips, A Comment on Proposals for Determining Amounts
of Punitive Awards, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1989).
95. See Dobbs, supra note 2, § 3.11 at 488. Evidence that a defendant is wealthy may
make it easier for some triers of fact to find that a tort was committed in the first place, to
award higher compensatory damages or to award punitive damages that otherwise would have
been rejected.
96. See, e.g., Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialties, Inc., 627 A.2d 1081, 1090 (N.J.
1993). In Herman, the court mandated that the punitive damages determination be bifurcated
from the liability determination in all claims arising under New Jersey law even though the
New Jersey legislature's requirement of bifurcation applied by its terms only to products liabil-
ity cases.
97. The Texas court in Lemon, for example, would have been well within its authority to
require, or at the very least to endorse, bifurcated proceedings. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 174(b).
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instructions cannot produce the fundamentally fair and reasonable results
that procedural due process guarantees. Uninformed juries are nothing
more than a lottery. Due process ought to be more than a game of chance.
Essays

